Latest revenue
$3.99B
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$1.05B
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
26.3%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
Where do you think ACGLO is heading?
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ACGLO vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $6.75B
- Enterprise value
- $-25.56B
- P/E (trailing)
- 1.5×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 0.28×
- Dividend yield
- 10.6%
- 52-wk high
- $22.20
- 52-wk low
- $19.28
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 349.4M
What this company does
Arch Capital Group is a Bermuda-based global underwriter writing property-casualty insurance, reinsurance, and mortgage insurance through subsidiaries. It earns money primarily from net premiums (~$4 billion quarterly) plus investment income on its $47 billion portfolio. First-quarter net income jumped 82% to $1.05 billion as loss expenses dropped sharply, and the company aggressively repurchased $813 million of stock, signaling a benign loss environment and excess capital deployment.
Generated from ACGLO's filing dated 2026-02-26
Key risks
- Premium softening: Net premiums earned fell to $3.99B from $4.19B YoY, signaling potential pricing pressure in P&C/reinsurance markets.
- Investment mark-to-market hit: AOCI swung from +$5M to -$333M as unrealized AFS losses of $338M and $87M net realized losses pressured book value.
- Aggressive buybacks at $7.2B treasury cost: $813M repurchased in Q1 alone, leaving equity flat YoY despite $1.05B net income.
Generated from ACGLO's filing dated 2026-02-26
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Fire, Marine & Casualty Insurance (74 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 13, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does ACGLO's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.