Latest revenue
$153.1M
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$9.7M
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
6.3%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
Where do you think KN is heading?
Keep private notes on KN — thesis, target price, catalysts to watch.
Visible only to you. Never shared. Never used to train AI.
KN vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $3.25B
- Enterprise value
- $3.34B
- P/E (trailing)
- 73.5×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 4.16×
- Dividend yield
- 0.0%
- 52-wk high
- —
- 52-wk low
- —
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 84.9M
What this company does
Knowles makes specialty electronic components—high-performance capacitors, RF filters, medtech microphones, and balanced armature speakers—used in medical devices, defense systems, industrial equipment, and electrification applications. It earns revenue by selling these custom-engineered parts to manufacturers needing reliability in demanding environments, generating $153 million in the latest quarter. Following the December 2024 divestiture of its Consumer MEMS Microphones business to Syntiant, Knowles has pivoted away from consumer electronics to focus entirely on higher-margin industrial and medtech markets.
Generated from KN's filing dated 2026-02-09
Key risks
- Syntiant exposure: $83.4M illiquid Series D-2 preferred (cost method) plus $5.9M junior note from CMM divestiture concentrates risk in one private buyer.
- Liquidity tightening: cash fell to $41.0M from $54.2M; revolver draws rose to $131M long-term debt while operating cash flow turned negative ($0.7M).
- Working capital build: inventories jumped to $136.2M (+$11.6M) amid only 15.8% revenue growth, signaling potential demand softness or overbuild risk.
Generated from KN's filing dated 2026-02-09
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Household Audio & Video Equipment (6 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does KN's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.