Latest revenue
$135.5M
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$51.3M
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
37.9%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
Where do you think SEZL is heading?
Keep private notes on SEZL — thesis, target price, catalysts to watch.
Visible only to you. Never shared. Never used to train AI.
SEZL vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Background shading marks the US business-cycle phase at each point in time — early, mid and late expansion, then recession— so you can see which economic backdrop each move happened in. Recessions are NBER-official; expansion sub-phases are ActaClear's editorial dating.
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $4.85B
- Enterprise value
- $4.88B
- P/E (trailing)
- 36.5×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 24.67×
- Dividend yield
- 0.0%
- 52-wk high
- $186.74
- 52-wk low
- $49.50
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 33.6M
What this company does
ITEM 1. BUSINESS Unless otherwise noted, references in this Form 10-K to “we,” “us,” “our,” “Company,” or “Sezzle” refer collectively to Sezzle Inc. and our subsidiaries. Our Company We are a purpose-driven payments company on a mission to financially empower the next generation. Launched in 2017, we have built a digital shopping and payments platform that provides consumers a flexible alternative to traditional credit. Through our products, we aim to give consumers control of their spending, ways to save money, and access to responsible credit. Our vision is to create a digital ecosystem benefiting all of our stakeholders—including merchants, consumers, employees, communities, and…
AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt
Generated from SEZL's filing dated 2026-02-26
Key risks
Table of Contents ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS Risks Related to Our Industry The BNPL industry has become subject to increased regulatory scrutiny, and our failure to manage our business to comply with new regulations would materially and adversely affect our business, results of operations and financial condition. Regulators in various jurisdictions in which we operate are showing increasing attention and scrutiny of BNPL arrangements. We may become subject to additional legal or regulatory requirements if laws, regulations, or industry standards, or their interpretations and/or enforcement thereof, change in the future. This risk may relate to regulatory requirements concerning the lending and…
AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt
Generated from SEZL's filing dated 2026-02-26
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Services-Business Services, NEC (109 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 17, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does SEZL's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.